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Criminal Jurisdiction, Tribal Courts and Public Defenders
Robert T. Anderson1
The impetus for this presentation is the establishment of the Tribal Court
Criminal Defense Clinic by the University of Washington School of Law and its
Native American Law Center. The Clinic is the public defender for the Tulalip Tribes
of Washington. Eight students take the year long clinic and after ten weeks of
preparation are appointed as counsel to defendants in tribal court prosecutions under
the supervision of the clinic director. The joint effort of the Tribes and the School of
Law is a direct product of the Indian self-determination era and reflects the Tribes'
decision to increase their law enforcement and tribal court capacity. The hope is to
develop a defender system as part of a justice system that is not just focused solely on
administering a criminal code and trying cases, but instead is part of the growing effort
to deal with the underlying causes of criminal activity. This essay outlines: basic
principles of federal Indian law and criminal jurisdiction within Indian country; the
history of the right to counsel in criminal matters in general and within tribal courts;
and, the defender program operated by the School of Law at the Tulalip Reservation.
I. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
The Supreme Court's rulings in three cases, known as the Marshall Trilogy, set
the foundation for the development of federal Indian law.2 Worcester v. Georgia was
the capstone of the trilogy and a case in which the State of Georgia had imprisoned
Sam Worcester for violating a state law that made it illegal for non-Indians to reside
within the Cherokee territory without a state permit. Chief Justice Marshall's majority
opinion for the Supreme Court rejected Georgia's claim of authority and explained the
status of Indian tribes under international and federal law in the following terms:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the
single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded
them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first
discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed. . . The
Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
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right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our
constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.3
This hard and fast rule precluding state jurisdiction within Indian country4 has
been modified over the years through Court decisions and federal statutes. In 1973 the
Supreme Court noted that:
The status of the tribes has been described as an anomalous one and of
complex character, for despite their partial assimilation into American
culture, the tribes have retained a semi-independent position ... not as
States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of
the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.5
The complexity has come in part because Congress has exercised its broad power over
Indian affairs in wildly divergent ways over the course of United States history.6
For example, one of the first Acts of Congress was the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1790, which secured tribal lands from state or private party
acquisition without the consent of the United States Congress.7  This protective
measure, however, was soon augmented by a contradictory federal effort in the 1820s
to "relocate" Indian tribes from the East to the Oklahoma Territory and other parts of
the West.8 The Indian removal statutes were supplemented by treaty negotiations with
western tribes to achieve peaceful relations with the tribes and perhaps more
importantly, cessions of vast areas for land hungry settlers. In exchange, the United
States agreed to recognize permanent homelands and often recognized off-reservation
hunting and fishing rights.9 Most of the "permanent" homelands promised in treaties,
however, were dramatically reduced in size when non-Indian settlers clamored for land
previously "guaranteed" by treaty. 10 There were frequent allegations by tribes of fraud
on the part of the United States in negotiation or implementation of the treaties. II
Congress ended treaty-making with tribes in 1871 when the House of Representatives
refused to appropriate funds to implement existing treaties unless the Senate agreed
that it would no longer participate in the treaty process with tribes. 12 Thereafter,
Congress more frequently legislated to change the jurisdictional rules when it saw fit,' 3
or when it disagreed with Supreme Court decisions.14 Major congressional acts were
adopted without even the veneer of consultation, much less agreement that surrounded
many of the treaties. 5 But Congress was not uniformly bent on the destruction of
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Indian tribes in the post-treaty era. The devastating effects of the Dawes Act were
repudiated when Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934.16 The
IRA was intended to strengthen tribal governments and to ensure permanent protection
for the remaining Indian land base.' 7 To that end, it offered tribes the opportunity to
reorganize their governmental structure pursuant to federally approved constitutions,
and stopped the process of allotment. Not long after passage of the IRA, Congress
again reversed course and called for the termination of a number of tribes. 18 The
termination policy was accompanied by the adoption of Public Law 280, which
authorized (and in some instances required) states to extend their jurisdictional reach
into Indian country. In response, Indian tribes organized on a national level to fight for
their political existence, which caused the abandonment of the termination policy by
the early 1960s. 19 President Nixon's dramatic message to Congress in 1970 announced
the policy of self-determination without termination. Congress followed suit by
adopting the Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975,20 which revived the pro-
sovereignty spirit of the IRA. The Indian Self-Determination Act reflects
congressional repudiation of the termination era and strong support for Indian tribes
that continues to prevail among Congress and the Executive Branch today. 21
II. THE MODERN ERA
Despite the frequent assaults on tribal sovereignty by the Congress and the
Executive Branch from Worcester v. Georgia22 to the present, tribes have maintained
their status as distinct political communities with powers of self-government, "not by
virtue of any delegation of powers, but rather by reason of their original tribal
sovereignty." 23 The "modern era" in Indian law commenced in 1959, when the
Supreme Court relied on the rule of Worcester v. Georgia to hold that disputes over
debts incurred on an Indian reservation must be heard in tribal court, i.e. state court
jurisdiction would not be allowed.24 The Court's ruling was the first of many in which
tribes and their members maintained their insulation from state judicial and regulatory
jurisdiction. 25
When tribal lands are involved, the Supreme Court has frequently (and
recently) affirmed that Indian tribes exercise governmental powers "not by virtue of
any delegation of powers, but rather by reason of their original tribal sovereignty."2 6
Applying this reasoning, the Court upheld the taxing authority of the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe and the Navajo Nation over non-Indian corporations doing business on tribal
lands.27 The Court echoed Worcester v. Georgia and relied on the seminal opinion
regarding the authority of Indian tribes, which noted that tribes possess inherent
powers, including "the power of taxation [which] may be exercised over members of
the tribe and over nonmembers."28 In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, the
Anderson
Court relied on these same principles to uphold tribal regulatory authority to regulate
non-Indian hunting and fishing on the Mescalero Apache reservation. The Court
struck down conflicting state regulations, noting that "State jurisdiction is preempted
by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal
interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are sufficient to
justify the assertion of State authority." 30
III. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
While a detailed discussion of federal jurisdiction over criminal matters within
Indian country is beyond the scope of this essay, it is useful to paint the history of
criminal jurisdiction within Indian country with a broad brush. 1 That history is
consistent with the general rule that state law, and even federal law, is not applicable to
tribes and their members within Indian country absent Treaty provision or express
congressional action.
32
The earliest treaties proceeded on the assumption that Indian tribes had the
authority to punish both Indian and non-Indian offenders.33 The Trade and Intercourse
Act of 1790 marked the beginning of a limiting trend in both treaties and statutes by
providing that citizens (non-Indians) who committed crimes against Indians would be
punished as provided by the law of the "state or district to which he or they may
belong." 34 The General Crimes Act (also known as the Indian Country Crimes Act)
asserted federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by either Indians or non-Indians in
the Indian country.35 The statute does not apply, however, to "offenses committed by
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law
of the tribe[.]", 6
In the late nineteenth century, Congress inserted itself for the first time into
intra-tribal criminal disputes following the Supreme Court's ruling in Ex Parte Crow
Dog.37  A Lower Brule Sioux Indian, Crow Dog, killed Spotted Elk in a dispute of
murky political origin on the Great Sioux Reservation in the Dakota Territory. 3' The
families of the two subsequently settled the matter according to tribal law.39 However,
the United States was determined to prosecute Crow Dog under federal law as a test
case and as part of the assimilation movement that favored increased non-Indian
control over Indians in Indian country.40 The Supreme Court held the United States
had no authority to prosecute an Indian for the murder of another Indian within an
Indian reservation. The Court reasoned that although tribes were subject to federal
authority, to find federal jurisdiction "requires a clear expression of the intention of
congress, and that we have not been able to find." 41 Congress promptly responded to
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Ex Parte Crow Dog by adopting the Major Crimes Act, which defined certain Indian
versus Indian crimes as federal offenses.4 2 The legal landscape respecting criminal
jurisdiction remained fairly static until the adoption of Public Law 280 in 1953. 43 That
statute provided several states with general criminal jurisdiction over Indian country
and offered such jurisdiction to other states.44
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe45 the Supreme Court held, for the first
time in 150 years, that incorporation of tribes into the United States deprived the tribes
of an inherent governmental power.46 Although loss of criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians was a significant blow, more damaging was the fact that the Court implied loss
of inherent tribal authority over non-Indians as it was said to be "inconsistent with
their status.,,47 This divestment of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was
followed by the decision in Duro v. Reina,48 which held that Indian tribes similarly
lacked authority to prosecute Indians not members of the governing tribe. Congress
promptly restored that jurisdiction when it amended the Indian Civil Rights Act in
1990 to define powers of tribal self-government to include jurisdiction to prosecute
non-member Indians in tribal court.4 9
IV. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Indian Civil Rights Act provides that Indian tribes may not "deny to any
person in a criminal proceeding the right. . . at his own expense to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense." 50 The provision was included as part of the comprehensive
Civil Rights Act of 1968, and was characterized by its chief sponsor "as an effort on
the part of those who believe in constitutional rights for all Americans to give 'the
forgotten Americans' basic rights which all other Americans enjoy.",51 The underlying
assumption of North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin's effort to provide constitutional
rights for individual Indians was that tribal governments were either not capable, or
unwilling to provide, what non-Indian politicians perceived as fairness or justice in the
treatment of tribal members and non-members. 52
While the right to counsel provided to defendants in tribal court proceedings is
similar to the right of those subject to federal or state prosecutions, it is not identical.
A defendant's right "to have the assistance of counsel for his defense" in federal
prosecutions is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Amendment has been interpreted to mean that if an accused "is not represented by
counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the
Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence
depriving him of his life or his liberty."53 In other words, the federal government is
obligated to provide counsel at the government's expense for indigent defendants.
States are similarly required to provide the accused with counsel when a defendant
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lacks the financial resources to hire his or her own attorney.5 4 The rationale for
insisting that states, like the federal government, be required to provide appointed
counsel was persuasively stated in Powell v. Alabama:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have [sic] a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.
55
The Court in Gideon v. Wainwright viewed the provision of appointed counsel
in criminal cases to be so important that it constitutes a fundamental right made
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
56
If the right is so uniformly regarded as crucial, why did Congress choose not to
mandate the provision of appointed counsel for indigent defendants in tribal court
prosecutions when it adopted the Indian Civil Rights Act? The version of the Indian
Civil Rights Act that became law was, for the most part, a substitute bill drafted by the
Department of the Interior. 57 The Interior Solicitor described the assistance of counsel
provision of the proposed bill as follows:
We have specified that the assistance of counsel will be provided at the
expense of the Indian defendant. There are several reasons for this. One
is that there are no attorneys on the reservations, neither prosecuting
attorneys nor defense attorneys, and there would be no bar over which
the court has jurisdiction from which it could select attorneys and over
which it would have authority to say to an attorney, 'You must represent
this litigant.' Accordingly, until a situation obtains where lawyers
would be available, we think that it should not be required that the
Indian tribes provide defense counsel.58
The great expense to the tribes of providing attorneys in all cases was also an
important factor, but from the Interior Department's perspective there was perhaps
even greater concern that the financial burden would fall on the Bureau of Indian
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Affairs - to fund both prosecutors and defenders in order to ensure balance in
representation. 9 In any event, there does not appear to be any significant effort to
force tribes to provide public defender services by amendment to the Indian Civil
Rights Act.60
Criminal activity within Indian country may subject an individual to federal or
state prosecution, but Tribes retain concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute and impose
punishment when the defendant is an Indian.6 1 Because tribes are separate sovereigns,
dual prosecutions do not implicate the double jeopardy clause. 62  The federal
government, or a state government may not assert its authority to prosecute some cases
due to lack of resources. A tribe may wish to prosecute offenders in order to assert its
independent authority and also ensure that local residents are witness to the tribe's
exercise of governmental power. This is true especially when an offense is a serious
felony that would normally subject a defendant to significant punishment. 63 Moreover,
Congress and the Executive branch have encouraged tribes to greatly increase their law
enforcement capacity in recent years and tribes have eagerly taken on the increased
responsibility.64  More police officers means that there are more arrests and more
arrests means that there are more defendants who need and want defense counsel.65
At the same time, Indian tribes generally do not wish to merely mimic state and federal
justice systems. This is a recurrent theme in the area of tribal law,66 that is, how to
maintain tribal values in the face of non-Indian values that bombard tribal life and
institutions in subtle and not so subtle ways.
V. CONCLUSION: THE TULALIP MODEL
The Tulalip Indian Reservation is located 25 miles north of Seattle, Washington
and was established pursuant to the Treaty of Point Elliot for the exclusive use and
occupancy of the Tribes and bands that ceded lands in the treaty.67 Article 6 of the
Treaty authorized the allotment of the reservation into individual parcels of land, which
were subsequently conveyed to non-Indians on a broad scale. 68 As a consequence of
the allotment process, approximately 11,000 of the reservation's 22,000 acres are held
in trust for the Tribes and individual members, while the other half of the reservation is
owned in fee simple by tribal members and nonmembers alike.69 Approximately 20%
of the reservation's ten thousand residents are tribal members.
Pursuant to Public Law 280,70 the State of Washington in 1958 assumed full
criminal jurisdiction over the Reservation. 71 A result of the State's assertion of
criminal jurisdiction was the displacement of the United States as the primary law
enforcement agency on the reservation. 72 Over time, the Tribes and their members
became increasingly dissatisfied with the manner in which the State carried out its law
enforcement duties. With the advent of the self-determination era and better economic
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fortunes, the Tribes began developing the government infrastructure to handle criminal
matters internally. In 1995, the State of Washington passed legislation authorizing the
retrocession of the criminal jurisdiction previously assumed by the State. The
Secretary of the Interior accepted the offer of retrocession in 2000. 73 With the State no
longer enforcing its criminal laws against Indians in most areas, the Tribes have
developed a full-blown criminal justice system to maintain law and order on the
reservation.74 The tribal criminal code extends to criminal offenses ranging from
homicide, kidnapping and assault to drug offenses and negligent driving.
75
In response to a proposal from the Tulalip Tribes, the University of Washington
School of Law created a Tribal Court Criminal Defense Clinic to provide
representation to low-income defendants charged with crimes on the Tulalip Indian
Reservation. The Clinic began taking cases in July of 2002 and by May of 2003 had
represented nearly 100 clients on over 160 charges. The Clinic operates on a three
quarter basis, with the students spending Fall quarter in class, learning advocacy skills
and law specific to the Tulalip Tribes. The eight students in the Clinic are assigned
cases from January through the first week of June. The Clinic Director, who is
required to be present with the students at all hearings, supervises them closely. The
Clinic Director handles all cases not assigned to Clinic students. The tribal
government now has a place to refer individuals who might otherwise seek individual
assistance by petitioning their government on a case-by-case basis. Most defendants
would likely proceed without representation in tribal court proceedings, which would
work to their detriment and might also clog the court system with pro se defendants ill-
prepared to navigate the court system.
The number of cases that went to trial in the first year was less than expected,
predominantly due to the flexibility allowed by the prosecution in structuring plea
offers that address the alcohol or drug related problems faced by the vast majority of
the criminal defendants. This focus on treatment versus punitive jail sentences is much
more palatable to the defendants and makes them less willing to take the risks of a
trial. 7
While the Clinic Director and student practitioners fill an important need in the
Tribes' justice system, they are careful to avoid the temptation to simply replicate the
non-Indian criminal defense model. One way that the clinic is seeking to develop and
maintain a "tribal" identity is by working with the prosecutor's office and the tribal
government's human services departments to ensure that the focus is not on whether an
individual is punished, but on dealing with the root causes of criminal activity. It is
well known that the root cause of criminal activity can often be found in addiction to
drugs and/or alcohol. Continued discussions and collaboration with the tribal
government, prosecutor and community will help develop approaches to deal with the
causes of crime and improve the lives of all connected with the reservation. The end is
not simply to avoid conviction, but to assist clients in improving their lives and thereby
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improve reservation life. The clinic has the added value of introducing law students to
criminal law, tribal law, trial advocacy and one aspect of life on an Indian reservation,
while providing a valuable service to individuals and the justice system.
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